Standing Committee D

[Mr. Bill O'Brien in the Chair]

Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill

Clause 120 - Offence of trespassing on designated site

Hazel Blears: I beg to move amendment No. 258, in clause 120, page 85, line 11, after 'site', insert
'in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 259 and 261 to 263.
Government new clause 28—Corresponding Scottish offence. 
Government new clause 29—Designated Scottish sites: access.

Hazel Blears: The amendments apply the offence of trespass on designated sites to Scotland. They also make various consequential amendments relating to the Bill's coming into force and its territorial extent.
Clauses 120 to 122 did not originally include provisions for Scotland because we needed to discuss with the Scottish Executive exactly how they would apply there. We have now reached agreement. There are a couple of differences in relation to Scots law: the period of imprisonment is 12 months rather than 51 weeks; the term trespasser is not used in Scotland—a trespasser is referred to as a person on a site without lawful authority—and there is no requirement to seek the consent of the Attorney-General in Scotland. 
Scottish Ministers will be responsible for designating sites in Scotland, where the sites are on Crown land or land belonging to the Queen or the Prince of Wales in their private capacity. The Secretary of State will be responsible for designating sites in Scotland on the ground of national security, because national security matters are a national, not a devolved, matter. That provision reflects the different responsibilities set out in the Scotland Act 1998. When the Home Secretary exercises the power to designate sites on the ground of national security, we have undertaken in correspondence with the Scottish First Minister to ensure that the Home Secretary does not do so without first consulting Scottish Ministers.

David Heath: I ought to know, but I do not, whether the lands appertaining to the Duchy of Cornwall are in the ownership of the Prince of Wales in his personal capacity.

Hazel Blears: I am informed that they are Crown land, so they fall into the first category of designation rather than the second. To ensure consistency, it is important that the powers apply to Scotland.

Dominic Grieve: I rise to say simply to say that I intend to leave my comments until the next group of amendments, in order to have a general discussion about the impact of the clause.
Amendment agreed to.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 251, in clause 120, page 85, line 21, leave out from 'capacity' to end of line 23 and insert—
 '(3A) The Secretary of State may not designate a site if the public has access to it or to any part of it.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 305, in clause 120, page 85, line 21, leave out from 'capacity' to end of line 23 and insert—
 '(3A) The Secretary of State may not designate a site to which the public has access.'. 
No. 306, in clause 120, page 85, line 39, leave out subsection (7).

Dominic Grieve: The proposed offence of trespassing on a designated site is superficially attractive, but we must carefully consider the implications of Parliament's actions in this respect. It has long been the principle in this country that trespass is a civil matter. There are exceptions, of course, such as entering certain designated sites restricted under various regulations, particularly highly sensitive places such as nuclear installations and the like. On the whole, I think the policy a good one, and if we are to depart from it, we must ensure that we do not widen the scope of the criminal law too much. We must also be careful to maintain a sense of proportion.
The amendments are essentially probing, to allow us to find out a little more about how the provisions will work in practice. The Secretary of State may designate sites in three categories under the clause. The first is Crown land, the second private lands belonging to Her Majesty the Queen or the heir to the throne, and the third land that the Secretary of State believes it is appropriate to designate in the interests of national security. 
What is meant by ''national security'' in that context? My definition of national security is pretty restricted, in that it relates to the protection of essential state security interests—for instance, major state installations. Could the concept be widened so that it includes anything that affects the day-to-day operation of the state? An obvious example might be a sit-down protest on Horseguards parade: it is not something that I would encourage people to do, but, while it might be disruptive, I would not associate it with a threat to state security. The Committee needs to consider how the issue will be addressed in practice. 
Secondly, and as important, we are creating a criminal offence. Trespass usually involves going on to land to which members of the public have no right of access, but there are permissive rights for people to enter a great deal of the private land in this country.  Those permissive rights can be withdrawn, but the public's attitude to such land will inevitably be different from their attitude to other sites. Furthermore, as far as public opinion is concerned, it is one thing to climb over a wall of Buckingham palace and rampage round the gardens having entered in order to do so, and quite another to go for a walk in Hyde park. Most people regard those things differently and will understand that the law is likely to be applied differently, but we must be careful not to introduce a law that criminalises those who decide to go on to land that they normally associate with being open to the public. 
That dovetails with the reasoning behind the next amendment, which addresses the concern that if the site is land to which members of the public normally have access, there should be a requirement—one that does not appear to be provided for in subsection (7)—that such people should be informed that they are trespassing and that they should leave before the criminal law comes into operation. That is what the amendments are designed to probe. Two of them are duplicatory, and I do not know why they feature separately. 
I hope that the Minister will respond to those points, because we are contemplating an important change to the law, and we should not let it go through on the nod.

David Heath: I simply wish to understand what the Minister intends by the clause, and the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) seem to provide an appropriate means to find out. I am grateful for the confirmation that Duchy of Cornwall land is Crown land, as such land covers a large part of my constituency. A number of the tenant farmers in my constituency are on Duchy land, so it will be interesting to know what it is intended in terms of designation and the extent to which common sense will be applied to the question of what constitutes Crown land that it is appropriate to designate and what is Crown land that it is not appropriate to designate? In the case of Duchy of Cornwall land, there is little that is appropriate for designation.
Secondly, I assume that the clause will cover any land occupied by the Ministry of Defence, whether it is Crown land per se, in which case it will automatically be designated, or whether it falls under subsection (3)(c). That might include land occupied by agencies working for the MOD—for example, since the dockyards have been privatised, they occupy some land that is not Crown land but that is used for the purposes for which they were set up. 
Thirdly, I have a nagging suspicion that subsection (3)(c) could be used and, in my view, abused to define as criminal trespass entry on to land that is used for purposes that are way beyond those that might be defined as sensitive or relating to national security. I can imagine such a power being used in the past at Greenham Common, or today outside RAF Fairford, now a United States air force base. The base is protected by virtue of being Crown land, but the land outside is not, and we have already seen arrests by the  Gloucestershire police for peaceful demonstrations outside RAF Fairford against its use by United States aircraft. Questions have been raised about the legality of that police action. It is not hard to imagine a Secretary of State being prevailed upon to say that land outside MOD land, or outside land used by Allied forces, required designation in the interest of national security. 
We need to know from the Minister the extent to which she believes the power will be used—clearly there are areas where its use is sensible, and there are areas where it would be an abuse. Unfortunately, it is hard to perceive such discrimination in the text of the clause; perhaps it cannot be built in, and we have to take it on trust that the Secretary of State will act in an appropriate way. However, I dislike taking things on trust from any Minister, simply because they may change.

Hazel Blears: Hon. Members are right to probe the issues through their amendments, because the law is being changed, but I hope to be able to give them some reassurance.
I must resist amendments Nos. 251 and 305 because the national security designation category for the new offence of trespass on a designated site would be removed from the Bill, and the Government believe that it is essential to retain that category to enable us to designate sites as such. However, I understand hon. Members' misgivings about the width of the definition of national security. 
It is general Government policy, not just of the current Government, not to define national security, as that could hinder our flexibility in dealing with new and emerging threats. A single rigid definition could prevent us from dealing with issues that arise. It has been recognised by the courts, both here and in Europe, that the definition of national security is primarily a matter for the Executive, in this case the Secretary of State through the order-making power of designation. In addition, the House of Lords ruled in the case of Rehman in 2001 that national security embraces a precautionary approach, that is, potential threats as well as actual threats, which gives the Executive fairly wide leeway for making definitions. 
We envisage being able to designate land belonging to the Crown, land belonging to the Queen or the Prince of Wales in their private capacity, and any land that falls under the national security designation. The provisions therefore cover places like Windsor castle and those parts of Buckingham palace not open to the public—clearly, some parts of the palace are open to the public, and as long as the public keep to those areas they will not be committing an offence. I hate to legislate in a reactive fashion, but hon. Members will be aware of the recommendations in the Armstrong report that followed Aaron Barschak's intrusion at Windsor castle and the security commission inquiry's report into Ryan Parry's intrusion into Buckingham palace. The clause is a result of those various security authorities' recommendations to us. The legislation is designed to address a particular set of circumstances,  specifically mischief, although we are not in the business of using that as a catch-all to enable a wide designation of sites across the country. 
I am concerned about the amendments relating to public access, because they would prevent sites where there is such access from being protected. The provision for a defence that people did not know the site was designated would be sufficient for them not to be prosecuted. Not only is there a defence, but the prosecution would have to have a realistic chance of success, which will militate against frivolous prosecutions of people who have unwittingly trespassed on a designated site. We have tried to draw the legislation to ensure that it is not a massive extension of restrictions on people's ability to enter various sites. 
We do need a deterrent and an incentive for people to leave a designated site. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield made a genuine point about the need to put up signage so that members of the public actually know that the site is designated and do not accidentally wander in and find themselves committing a criminal offence. There is provision in the legislation to allow the Secretary of State to put up signage. The various sites will be designated through order, which will need to be laid before Parliament. 
This is a fairly modest set of proposals, designed to attack the particular mischief of people getting into Buckingham palace and Windsor castle. It may well be that, in future, it will be considered appropriate to designate the Palace of Westminster on grounds of national security. Clearly, that will be a matter for consideration of the Secretary of State when drawing up the designated orders. As I think that the amendments would undermine the purpose of the legislation. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw them.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister, and I will ask leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment. However, at the end of a speech that otherwise filled me with considerable comfort, the Minister properly highlighted the fact that there might come a day on which we would have to designate the Palace of Westminster or, as I think she is more likely to mean, parts of it. That might get us into difficulties. I want the Minister to reflect on my concern that the proposals be kept simple. One of the concerns that underlay the tabling of the amendments was that once we start to designate parts of sites but not entire sites, we start to create quite a complicated set of rules. It may not be impossible. I suppose that we could end up with little notices down the Members' Corridor, which I have to say has now become a public freeway. It certainly was not 25 years ago when my father was in Parliament: no one went down there except for Members and senior staff. We will have to put up notices, and that could turn out to be quite intrusive. I hope that the Minister will bear in mind that if the  measure starts to become disproportionate, it will quickly be brought into disrepute. Subject to that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 120, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 121 - Designated Sites: powers of arrest

Amendment made: No. 259, in clause 121, page 86, line 20, at end insert— 
 '(3) A constable in uniform may, in Scotland, arrest without warrant any person he reasonably suspects is committing or has committed an offence under section (Corresponding Scottish offence).'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Clause 121, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 122, 125 and 126 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 127 - Anti-social behaviour orders etc.: reporting restrictions

Amendment made: No. 260, in clause 127, page 91, line 47, leave out 
'after the definition of ''British Transport Police Force''' 
and insert 
'before the definition of ''the commencement date''.'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Clause 127, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 128 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 134 - Publication of local policing information

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 197, in clause 134, page 100, line 14, at end insert—
 '(1A) Such a report shall include a report on matters relating to the policing of each local authority area within the police authority's area; 
 (1B) In this section ''local authority'' means— 
(a) in relation to England— 
(i) a county council, 
(ii) a district council, 
(iii) a council of a district comprised in an area for which there is no county council, 
(iv) a London borough council, or 
(v) the Common Council of the City of London; 
(b) in relation to Wales, the council of a county or county borough.'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 198, in clause 134, page 100, line 15, leave out 'Such a report' and insert
 'A report issued under subsection (1A).'.

David Heath: We are now dealing with the provisions on producing local policing information. The Government's idea in that regard is perfectly proper, and I commend it; it is important that people know how their local police force is performing its duties and have genuine information about what is happening in their area. My difficulty is simply with the terms in which the clause is couched, because it refers to the police authority area, rather than to something to which people can genuinely relate.
Of course, it is of interest to know how one's police force as a whole is operating, but we may be dealing with joint forces, covering more than one county area. I am thinking, in my case, of the Avon and Somerset police and, in the Minister of State's case, of the Greater Manchester police; there are also the Thames Valley police. It is of limited value having an overall view of how such a force is doing if the information is not broken down to show what is happening in the locality in which one lives. 
The amendments would bring the local policing summary down to the level of at least the local authority area—the district in which one lives. One could argue that it would be possible to break the summary down in several ways, and the basic command unit might be appropriate, although that is a policing term, rather than a term that the public understand. Similarly, a policing sector is a particular entity in policing terms, but I am not sure that the public always understand it. In the Somerton part of my constituency, for instance, there are always considerable concerns about crime levels. Although I share some of those concerns—certainly those about the level of policing—I also have to explain to people that the Somerton sector actually comprises a very large area and that crime levels in Somerton itself are in fact relatively low. That is just one example, but I am sure that it applies in many other areas. 
Similarly, in the London boroughs, knowing what the Metropolitan police are doing as an entity is of limited use; knowing what was happening in the borough in which one lives is of considerable use. Providing such information would not only inform the public, but enable elected members of local authorities properly to question police commanders in their area about their performance and priorities. Of course, that would also build on the policing partnerships and other provisions that the Government have already put in place. 
I think that good police authorities will want to do what I envisage; they will want to break down information so that it is relevant to local people. However, that is not required by statute, and I very much want that to happen. I have argued, and shall continue to argue, that the whole structure of policing should be more localised—not in terms of breaking down force areas, but in terms of making policing relate much more closely to local communities. Indeed, I would change police funding to reflect that, so that local authorities, district councils or borough councils had a direct relationship with policing in their areas and could negotiate a guaranteed level of policing, with people paying towards its funding.

Hazel Blears: The hon. Gentleman knows that our views on the matter are very similar, and I am sympathetic to his amendment. Inevitably, however, I shall resist it, because although I believe that information should be provided, even below local authority level, people are most interested in the crime levels in their neighbourhood and what is happening on the few streets where they live, and what things are like when they walk out at night and take their children to the park and when they catch the bus to work. They also want to know how to contact their local police officers; we talked, for example, about beat officers making their mobile phone numbers available. All that is now happening and is part of our drive towards better and more responsive neighbourhood policing, but the duty in the clause is on the police authority. We certainly intend in our guidance to encourage the police to provide information at the lowest possible level, because that is how one secures real engagement with the community.
The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) knows that it is particular passion of mine to try to engage local people in their own services. A key part of that engagement is information. As well as needing to know who their police officers are, people need information about performance and how their police are performing in comparison with other police services so that they can help to drive the improvements in their area. The Association of Police Authorities is very keen to provide that information, but has asked us not to be too prescriptive. I believe that to be right, because there will be a whole range of ways in which that information can be provided to local communities, which we want to encourage the police to use. 
We will set minimum standards, which authorities can obviously exceed if they choose to do so. Liverpool authorities, for example, have divided their areas into particular beat districts, and each member of the public receives a card with details of their local commander and how they can get hold of their beat officers, which has dramatically improved public confidence in and satisfaction with the services that are available. 
This is an important clause, and I do not agree with the amendment. Local authority boundaries are not necessarily coterminous with basic command units. Coterminosity is a problem that bedevils us, so  conferring a duty on police authorities to implement it at crime and disorder reduction partnership and neighbourhood level, which will be increasingly important in the policing landscape of the future, is an appropriate way to proceed. 
There is very little difference between my argument and the hon. Gentleman's, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

David Heath: I am extremely grateful for the Minister's reply. We obviously do not disagree at all.
I specified district council or borough council because of the requirement under subsection (4)(b) for the local policing summary to be sent out with the council tax demand. That is how I interpret it. Although it can also be sent out in other ways, the implication is that an appropriate way of issuing the summary is to include it in the bundle that accompanies one's council tax demand. That, of course, is the collecting authority's responsibility. In purely logistic terms, I suspect that many police authorities will not want to send out several different versions to different people within a district council's area because of the nightmare of postcoding and so on. The whole thing becomes too complex to be entirely manageable. 
Provided that the guidance is issued—we have the Minister's assurance, which she was more than happy to give—and given that we agree, it would be perverse to press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 134 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 135 - Responsibilities in relation to the health and safety etc. of police

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 309, in clause 135, page 102, line 21, leave out subsection (5).

Bill O'Brien: With this we may discuss amendment No. 310, in clause 135, page 102, line 30, leave out subsection (7).

Dominic Grieve: The clause is designed to remove the problem that occurred recently whereby a chief commissioner of police and his predecessor had to sit in the dock at the Old Bailey as the persons responsible under a health and safety prosecution concerning an injury to a police officer. I therefore welcome the development in clause 135. Having done a great many health and safety prosecution, I have always found it strange that corporations enjoy so much more protection than unincorporated associations or individuals.
I have, in my time, been involved in the prosecution of the trustees of the Blenheim estate, where, as I recollect, a distinguished QC, the senior partner of a firm of London solicitors and Uncle Tom Cobleigh and all were all sitting in the dock in Oxford Crown  court, even though their direct involvement in the injury of the person whose arm had been cut off by a rotary saw in a sawmill in Oxfordshire was completely peripheral. They just happened to be the trustees of the operation that ran that mill. 
I was also involved in the prosecution of Lloyd's Register of Shipping, which involved some 40 trustees, including the Duke of Edinburgh. On that occasion, in order to avoid having to bring all those people to the Crown court to sit in the dock, we used a device whereby we agreed simply to prosecute them in the name of Lloyd's Register of Shipping and not require the individuals to attend. If I may say so to the Minister, that issue should be looked at as well. 
I have one query, however. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that in future the chief commissioner or chief constable can be prosecuted in his name but not personally. At the same time, the Government have rightly introduced another clause, which is in line with the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, to the effect that personal liability may lie if a person has consented to the commission of the offence or personally connived in it, or if the commission of the offence was attributable to personal neglect on his part. That is entirely compatible with the 1974 Act and very sensible too. 
There is one oddity, however, which I have sought to highlight and on which I should be grateful for the Minister's comments. The Government have chosen to make the operation of the change retrospective, by removing the liability of the police chief from being prosecuted in his own name under the 1974 Act. However, they have not been able to make the connivance clauses apply retrospectively, which will bite only when the Bill becomes law. 
If I understand it correctly—perhaps the Minister can confirm this—current police chiefs must be keeping their fingers crossed that if anything terrible has happened in respect of health and safety, it will have been between 1998 and 2005. If an incident is in that period, a police chief will not be prosecuted in his own name and will not have to sit in the dock, but will be prosecuted as a corporation sole. Fortunately for him, however, the connivance clauses will not yet have come into operation, even though he might have connived in the commission of the offence. That is the slight oddity on which we should like the Minister's views.

Hazel Blears: I welcome the hon. Gentleman's general support for the steps that we are taking. The commissioner in question—shortly to be the ex-commissioner—and his predecessor were put in an invidious position by being prosecuted personally.
A couple of years ago we undertook to make a change. The original proposal was to transfer liability to police authorities, but we re-examined that and realised that it was not appropriate because it should still be possible to look at the force activities rather than the police authority. The provision that we enacted was not, therefore, commenced. The provisions before the Committee today take a more  sensible approach, so that the prosecution would be in the name of the corporation—the office of chief constable rather than the chief constable personally. 
The transfer of liability from the individual to the corporation does not mean that we take health and safety any less seriously than previously. Health and safety is incredibly important in the police service, and we want it to continue to be important. 
As to the hon. Gentleman's points about retrospective action, I hope that he welcomes it, because we do not want chief constables to continue to be liable with respect to incidents where there was no personal connivance, occurring between 1998, when the liabilities were first placed on the force, and the granting of Royal Assent. The distance between us is narrow and concerns instances in which the retrospective aspect of the provision would prevent someone who had personally connived at an offence and been responsible for it from being brought to book for what they had done. 
The hon. Gentleman has a point, and I should consider it in more detail. An important distinction can be made: if an offence is made out in an organisational way, the organisation is clearly responsible, but where an offence is made out on the grounds of someone's personal neglect and culpability the issue is important. We do not want to allow people to escape if they should be brought to account for their actions. I undertake to consider the matter in more detail and discover whether the clause could have results that none of us would want. If so, I undertake to do something about the situation.

Dominic Grieve: I think that the Minister will have a problem. Retrospective effect is all right when it confers a benefit, such as removing the liability to prosecution in person, as opposed to prosecution of a corporation sole, but it cannot be used to backdate the creation of a new criminal offence, which is what the connivance clauses are. The Minister is probably saddled with the consequence of the decision to make the change in question. The other approach is to provide that the change by which a chief constable will be prosecuted as a corporation sole should come into force only when the Bill does. The Minister may decide that that is too onerous. I think that what I have outlined is the reason why the provision has been drafted as it has, and if I am wrong, the Minister will no doubt write to tell me.

Vera Baird: That is a very interesting point. Is the chief constable any worse off than under the previous arrangement?

Dominic Grieve: He is much better off.

Vera Baird: Indeed; then I am not following the hon. Gentleman's point.

Dominic Grieve: It seems to me that under the clause, for the period from 1998 to the present day, a chief constable is much better off, because as from the date when the Bill comes into operation, he will not longer have to go into the dock or be personally responsible  for any offence that may have been committed between 1998 and the measure's coming into force; however, the connivance clauses, which are an important part of the health and safety legislation, still do not bite on him, because they cannot be made to apply retrospectively. That is what I think has happened.

Vera Baird: I think that that is right.

Dominic Grieve: I am most grateful to the hon. and learned Lady. I shall now discover, when the Minister writes to me, that we are both wrong.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
Clause 135 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clause 136 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 - Investigations into conduct of police officers: accelerated procedure in special cases

Amendments made: No. 269, in schedule 11, page 180, line 19, after '20B(3)', insert 'or 20E(3)'. 
No. 270, in schedule 11, page 181, line 12, at end insert— 
 '(5A) After submitting a report under this paragraph, the person appointed or designated to investigate the complaint or recordable conduct matter shall continue his investigation to such extent as he considers appropriate.'. 
No. 271, in schedule 11, page 182, line 4, after '(b)', insert 
'subject to any request made under paragraph 20G(1),'. 
No. 272, in schedule 11, page 183, line 19, leave out from 'shall' to end of line 21 and insert 
'notify the appropriate authority and the person appointed under paragraph 18 or designated under paragraph 19 of its determination.'. 
No. 273, in schedule 11, page 183, line 38, after '(b)', insert 
'subject to any request made under paragraph 20G(1),'. 
No. 274, in schedule 11, page 184, line 10, leave out from 'shall' to end of line 11 and insert 
'notify the person appointed under paragraph 16 or 17 of its determination.'. 
No. 275, in schedule 11, page 184, line 39, leave out from beginning to end of line 5 on page 185 and insert— 
 '20G (1) On receiving a copy of a special report under paragraph 20B(5) or 20E(5), the Director of Public Prosecutions may request the appropriate authority not to bring disciplinary proceedings without his prior agreement, if the Director considers that bringing such proceedings might prejudice any future criminal proceedings.'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to. 
Clause 137 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 12 - Investigations of deaths and serious injuries during or after contact with the police

Amendments made: No. 276, in schedule 12, page 194, leave out lines 13 to 15. 
'; and 
'( ) send to it (or each of them) a copy of the submission under sub-paragraph (1).'. 
No. 278, in schedule 12, page 194, leave out lines 32 to 34. 
No. 279, in schedule 12, page 194, line 37, after 'determination', insert 
'and send to that authority a copy of the submission under sub-paragraph (3)'. 
No. 280, in schedule 12, page 195, line 4, leave out 'as a conduct matter' and insert 
'under paragraph 11 as a conduct matter (and the other provisions of this Schedule shall apply in relation to that matter accordingly)'. 
No. 281, in schedule 12, page 195, leave out lines 5 to 12. 
No. 282, in schedule 12, page 196, line 40, leave out from beginning to end of line 38 on page 197 and insert— 
 '24B (1) If the Commission determines under paragraph 24A(4) that the report indicates that a person serving with the police may have— 
(a) committed a criminal offence, or 
(b) behaved in a manner which would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings, 
it shall notify the appropriate authority in relation to the person whose conduct is in question of its determination and, if it appears that that authority has not already been sent a copy of the report, send a copy of the report to that authority. 
 (2) Where the appropriate authority in relation to the person whose conduct is in question is notified of a determination by the Commission under sub-paragraph (1), it shall record the matter under paragraph 11 as a conduct matter (and the other provisions of this Schedule shall apply in relation to that matter accordingly).'. 
No. 283, in schedule 12, page 197, line 39, after '24C', insert '(1)'. 
No. 284, in schedule 12, page 197, line 46, after 'desirable', insert— 
 '(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not affect any power of the Commission to make recommendations or give advice under section 10(1)(e) in other cases (whether arising under this Schedule or otherwise).'. 
No. 285, in schedule 12, page 197, line 47, leave out paragraph 25.—[Ms Blears.] 
Schedule 12, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 138 - Abolition of Royal Parks Constabulary

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Jonathan Djanogly: In a previous political incarnation, I was chairman of Westminster city council's environment committee. In that capacity, I had regular meetings with the management of the royal parks. An important part of those meetings was the security of the parks, and an important part of that was the role played by the Royal Parks constabulary, which the clause will abolish. I am not saying that that is necessarily the wrong thing to do, but certain questions arise.
We cannot underestimate how important the royal parks are to the capital; they cater to tourists, and provide a green lung and a little environmental space for Londoners. One aspect that we often take for granted, however, is the security, which I saw at first hand. The Royal Parks constabulary, as cuddly and friendly as its officers may have looked, was very effective at running the parks and maintaining a sense of security. If there were a spate of crimes, however, that trust and confidence could be lost very quickly. 
Has the Minister had consultations with the Metropolitan police to ensure that the officers who will replace the Royal Parks constabulary are dedicated and have the same desire to be involved with the local community? Will they be dedicated to the parks, so that they will not be pulled away if there is an emergency in another part of the capital? One idea might be to have a force of dedicated community support officers for the royal parks, but I do not know. The important point is to address such issues, because if confidence is lost, things could go very badly, very quickly.

David Heath: Following on from the remarks by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly), I may say that this is an organisational, rather than a statutory matter. However, is it the Minister's intention that some of the officers in the Royal Parks constabulary will be absorbed by the Metropolitan police as constables? I gather that some may become CSOs attached to the Met. Will they form a distinct district in the Met or will they be absorbed into the districts in which the parks are situated?

Hazel Blears: I am delighted that hon. Members hold the policing of the royal parks in such esteem and affection. The parks are an important asset to the country, as has been said, for residents and workers in London as well as for tourists, and we all appreciate them.
In recent years, however, because the Royal Parks constabulary has been separate from the rest of the policing service, it has sometimes not been as attractive a place to work as the mainstream service. Moving the Royal Parks constabulary into the organisational framework of the Metropolitan police will make the job more attractive. 
The proposal also has elements to do with community policing in our parks, which is important. In the past year, as we have worked up to the change, there has been a co-policing arrangement with the Met whereby PCSOs have been introduced alongside the Royal Parks constabulary. The skills and attitude of the PCSOs—the guidance, relationship building, directing of tourists to where they want to go and so on—have been exactly what hon. Members have  wanted. The proposal will be an improvement for parks policing, because there will be access to the full range of the Met's ability yet that important neighbourhood attitude will be retained. 
How things will be organised is an operational matter for the commissioner rather than a matter for me, but I am sure that he is acutely aware of the need to provide an appropriate service and ensure that the parks remain safe and attractive places for tourists and residents to visit. 
Many of the current officers will transfer as constables. Some will become PCSOs and some will become other employees of the Met. I assure hon. Members that the policing of the parks will remain a priority because of their importance to the community. 
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 138 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Schedule 13 agreed to. 
Clause 139 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 140 - Criminal record certificates

Amendments made: No. 38, in clause 140, page 106, line 3, leave out 'England and Wales' and insert 
'any part of the United Kingdom'. 
No. 39, in clause 140, page 108, line 25, leave out from 'person' to end of line 28 and insert— 
'(a) if the applicant is not included in a specified children's list, of that fact; 
(b) if the applicant is included in such a list, of the details prescribed for the purposes of section 113C(1)(b) above; 
(c) if the applicant is not subject to a specified children's direction, of that fact; 
(d) if the applicant is subject to such a direction, of the grounds on which the direction was given and the details prescribed for the purposes of section 113C(1)(d) above.'. 
No. 40, in clause 140, page 108, line 44, after 'statement''', insert ', ''specified children's direction'''. 
No. 41, in clause 140, page 110, line 7, leave out from 'Act' to end of line 9 and insert 
'of 1997 in connection with consideration by a court of whether to make a special guardianship order under section 14A of the Children Act 1989.'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Clause 140, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 14 - Amendments of Part 5 of Police Act 1997

Amendments made: No. 61, in schedule 14, page 201, line 35, at end insert— 
'(c) after subsection (6) (as inserted by section 142(2) of this Act) insert— 
 ''(7) In the case of such a body the reference in subsection (5) to a police authority must be construed as a reference to such body as is prescribed.''.'. 
No. 62, in schedule 14, page 202, line 7, at end add— 
 '14 In section 125, at the end add—
 ''(6) If the power mentioned in subsection (1) is exercised by the Scottish Ministers, the reference in subsection (3) to each House of Parliament must be construed as a reference to the Scottish Parliament.''.'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Schedule 14, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 141 - Criminal records checks: verification of identity

Amendment made: No. 42, in clause 141, page 110, line 18, at end insert— 
'(ba) by Driver and Vehicle Licensing Northern Ireland;'. —[Ms Blears.] 
Clause 141, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 142 - Certain references to police forces

Amendments made: No. 43, in clause 142, page 110, line 28, leave out 
 '(11)(a) to (i) and (12)' 
and insert 
 '(10)(a) to (i) and (11)'. 
No. 44, in clause 142, page 110, line 34, leave out from 'In' to 'after' and insert 
'each version of section 120A of that Act (as inserted respectively by section 134(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 and section 70 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003),'. 
No. 45, in clause 142, page 110, line 37, leave out 
'(11)(a) to (i) and (12)' 
and insert 
'(10)(a) to (i) and (11)'. 
No. 46, in clause 142, page 111, line 3, leave out 
'(11)(a) to (i) and (12)' 
and insert 
'(10)(a) to (i) and (11)'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Clause 142, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 143 - Further amendments to Police Act 1997 as it applies to Scotland

Amendment made: No. 47, in clause 143, page 111, line 13, at end insert 'or 124A(1) and (2)'.—[Ms Blears.] 
Clause 143, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 144 - Part 5 of the Police Act 1997: Channel Island and Isle of Man

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: I rise simply to ask why the clause is necessary. It would appear to give Her Majesty the power to do something within the bailiwicks or the Isle of Man that she ought to be permitted to do as  sovereign of those Crown territories without recourse to Parliament. I am not clear about the need for the clause.

Hazel Blears: At the moment, the provisions of the Police Act 1997 dealing with information on the local police force do not extend to the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. As the Criminal Records Bureau has no jurisdiction there, it cannot directly ask for information from those police forces. We have a sort of gateway arrangement under which the nearest mainland force provides the information. It works, but it is more like a post box, and it is an extra administrative burden.
We want to extend part 5 to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man by Order in Council. That would give us the opportunity to get rid of the gateway and post box function and allow the CRB to request information directly from those police forces.

David Heath: That is commendable. I do not argue with the intention, but I do not entirely see why it is necessary. It will change legislation in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man so that the UK Parliament has a locus there. However, I am happy with the Minister's assurance.
Clause 144 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
Clauses 145 and 146 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 147 - Private Security Industry Act 2001: Scottish extent

Amendment made: No. 48, in clause 147, page 112, line 41, at end insert— 
 '( ) In Schedule 2 to the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002 (asp 11) (persons liable to investigation) after paragraph 90 add— 
 ''91 The Security Industry Authority.'''.—[Ms Blears.] 
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

David Cairns: The clause is small, but it is significant for my constituency, as it extends the Private Security Industry Act 2001, which currently applies only to England and Wales, to Scotland. It shows the maturity of the devolution set-up that the Bill can be used as a vehicle to extend those important provisions to Scotland, but it puts the onus on those of us who represent Scottish constituencies to ask a few questions of the Minister and probe her on exactly what it will mean.
I understand that the Scottish Executive has been consulting on the possibility of having similar provisions in Scotland to those in the 2001 Act but that it has not yet had time to legislate. It is a testimony to the relationship between the Executive and the Government that an agreement has been reached that allows the Bill to be used as a means of achieving that.

David Heath: We have been doing that since 1707; it is nothing novel for us.

David Cairns: The hon. Gentleman might have noticed that, since 1707, the Scottish Parliament has been re-established, and we do not generally have bolt-on legislation that applies only in Scotland. He may have been dozing when we passed the Scotland Act.
The concerns about the behaviour of bouncers, private security firms, wheel clampers and so on that gave rise to the 2001 Act in England and Wales obviously do not stop at the border. Those concerns are as valid in my constituency as they are in every part of the kingdom. I know of a constituent whose son—an off-duty police officer—was seriously assaulted by a bouncer in a club. Perhaps he should have known better, but, under severe provocation, he fought back, and lost his job as a result. I suspect every hon. Member will know of an instance of behaviour by bouncers or private security firms that goes well beyond the law as it would apply to any ordinary citizen regarding affray, breach of the peace or assault. 
Too many bouncers and private security firms operate as pseudo-gangster operations. Presumably that is why the 2001 Act was brought in. In some of the major cities in Scotland, in Glasgow and particularly in Edinburgh, there is a great deal of concern about the operation of such firms, so the provisions are timely. I do not wish to detain the Committee unduly, because the Private Security Act will have received a great deal of scrutiny, and I am sure it is an appropriate legislative vehicle if it is applying in England and Wales. However, given that the Act has been in operation for three years now, will the Minister tell us her assessment of its impact? How many prosecutions there have been? How many licences have been revoked? Does she believe that there has been a marked improvement in the behaviour of private security firms and bouncers as a result of the legislation being in place? Since the authorities in Scotland will be implementing that legislation upon Royal Assent to the Bill, what lessons have been learnt from its implementation in England and Wales?

Hazel Blears: My hon. Friend the Member for Greenock and Inverclyde (David Cairns) raises some important matters. There has been excellent co-operation between us and the Scottish Executive. I understand regulation of the private security sector is supported not just by the public in Scotland but also by many people in the decent parts of the industry who desperately want to raise standards and get rid of the criminal element that is sometimes present in the security sector.
Our provisions provide for consultation between us and Scottish Ministers to ensure that, when we make decisions, they take into account the situation in Scotland. Although the Security Industry Authority  has been established for a couple of years now, it started issuing licences only last June, so it is fairly early days. It expects to license about 40,000 door supervisors, and we have been rolling that out on a regional basis across the country. I have no doubt that the experience of the SIA as it has carried out the licensing process will inform its operation in Scotland and it will have learned lessons. 
The SIA is not simply about the administrative process of licensing. It is also designed to raise standards in the industry and ensure that it becomes a respectable part of the security field. That is a difficult task. It is about major cultural and transformational change in the industry, but the decent firms want to do that. It is important that we drive out the poor firms. 
There is one interesting difference regarding the provisions in Scotland: apparently vehicle immobilisers, or wheel clampers, will not be licensed in Scotland because that is already illegal—it is classed as ''extortion'' north of the border. 
We have tried to ensure that all the appeal provisions are correct in relation to the Scottish legal system, so the appeal in the first instance is to the sheriff. I hope my hon. Friend is reassured that the SIA will take its duties in relation to Scotland very seriously. Over the next few years, I hope to see a transformation of the private security industry, with decent terms and conditions for the employees within it and real integrity and probity in the firms that undertake security work, not just in England, but in Scotland. 
Question put and agreed to. 
Clause 147, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 15 - Private Security Industry Act 2001: Scottish extent

Amendment made: No. 63, in schedule 15, page 202, leave out lines 42 to 44.—[Ms Blears.] 
Schedule 15, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 116 - Harassment intended to deter lawful activities

Evan Harris: I beg to move amendment No. 341, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'be', insert 'reasonably considered to be'.

Bill O'Brien: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 342, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'victim', insert 'or target'.
Clause stand part. 
Amendment No. 343, in clause 117, page 83, line 27, after 'presence', insert 'or conduct'. 
Amendment No. 344, in clause 117, page 83, leave out lines 42 to 44. 
'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or to both, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'. 
Amendment No. 224, in clause 117, page 84, line 13, leave out 'in uniform'. 
Clause 117 stand part. 
Amendment No. 225, in clause 118, page 84, line 41, leave out from 'liable' to end of line 43 and insert— 
'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'. 
Amendment No. 101, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add— 
 '(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court.'. 
Amendment No. 254, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add— 
 '(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court in the circumstances where the period specified under subsection (4)(b) exceeds 10 days.'. 
Clause 118 stand part. 
New clause 18—Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application— 
 'The following section is inserted after section 723C of the Companies Act 1985— 
 ''723CA Individual members' confidentiality orders 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
 (2) That condition is that the individual— 
(a) is or proposes to become a member of a relevant company; and 
(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk''). 
 (3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential address creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''an individual member's confidentiality order'') in relation to him. 
 (4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application. 
 (5) At any time when an individual member's confidentiality order is in force in relation to an individual the name and address of the individual in the register of members of the company which is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such name and address save in prescribed circumstances. 
 (6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed.
 (7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke an individual member's confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 19—Names and addresses of members of companies: company application— 
 'The following section is inserted after section 723CA of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application]— 
 ''723CB Company members confidentiality orders 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a company may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
 (2) That condition is that the company considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of the names and usual residential or business addresses of the members of the company creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that a member of the company or a person who lives with or is an employee of a member of the company will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk''). 
 (3) Where, on an application made by a company under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of that company's members' usual residential addresses creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that a member, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''a company members confidentiality order'') in relation the company. 
 (4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application. 
 (5) At any time when a company members confidentiality order is in force in relation to a company, the name and address of any individual in the register of members of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order, shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such names and addresses save in prescribed circumstances. 
 (6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed. 
 (7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a company members confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 20—Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies— 
 ''The following section is inserted after section 723CB of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Names and addresses of members of companies: company application]— 
 ''723CC Chargee confidentiality orders 
 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
 (2) That condition is that the individual— 
(a) is or proposes to become a chargee or mortgagee of a relevant company; and 
(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his or its name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his or it will be subjected to violence or intimidation ('the serious risk'). 
 (3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential or business address in relation to documents required to be held by Companies House or by the company in relation to the charge or mortgage creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section ('a chargee confidentiality order') in relation to him. 
 (4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application. 
 (5) Where a chargee confidentiality order is made under subsection (3) above the name and residential or business address of the chargee or mortgagee of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be revealed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House access to such name and address save in prescribed circumstances. 
 (6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed by regulations. 
 (7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a chargee confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 21—Confidentiality orders: associated companies— 
 ''The following section is inserted after section 723CC of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies]— 
 ''723CD Confidentiality orders: associated companies 
 (1) Where a relevant confidentiality order is made in relation to a relevant company and the Secretary of State is satisfied that in relation to another company ('company A') the condition in subsection (2) below applies, he shall extend the operation of the order to that other company or make a further relevant confidentiality order (including a confidentiality order of a different kind) in relation to that other company, as the case may be. 
 (2) The condition is that the availability for inspection or disclosure by members of the public of the particulars of the appropriate individual's usual residential or business address in a document relating to company A which is, by virtue of this Act required to be available for such inspection or disclosure, creates (or if an order is not extended or made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subject to violence or intimidation. 
 (4) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (1); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed. 
 (5) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a decision or a relevant confidentiality order made under this section if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'. 
New clause 22—Director's confidentiality orders: directors etc.— 
 '(1) In section 723C(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (effect of confidentiality orders), the words ''that were contained in a document delivered to the registrar after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''that are contained in a document delivered to the registrar at any time''. 
 (2) In section 723D(3)(b) of that Act (construction of sections 723B and 723C) the words ''after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''at any time''. 
 (3) In section 723B(3), (7), (8)(d), (9), section 723C(1), (6)(a), (7)(a) and 723D(4) of that Act and in the headings to the said sections 723B and 723C, the words ''confidentiality order'' and ''confidentiality orders'' are replaced by ''director's confidentiality order'' and ''director's confidentiality orders'' as the case may be.''.'. 
New clause 23—Confidentiality orders: miscellaneous— 
 '(1) The following amendments are made to the Companies Act 1985. 
 (2) In section 709(1) (Inspection, etc of records kept by the registrar), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD''.
 (3) In section 356, (inspection of register of members), after subsection (6), the following subsection is inserted— 
 ''(7) Subsections (1) and (6) are subject to sections 723CA and 723CB.'' 
 (4) In section 408, (right to inspect instruments which create charges, etc), after subsection (4), the following subsection is inserted— 
 ''(5) Subsections (1) and (4) are subject to sections 723CC.''. 
 (5) In section 723C(4) (effect of confidentiality order), ''confidentiality order'' is replaced by ''relevant confidentiality order''. 
 (6) In section 723D (construction of sections 723B and 723C)— 
(a) In subsection (1), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'', 
(b) In subsection (4)— 
(i) ''section 723B and 723C'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723C, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'', 
(ii) the following definition is inserted in the appropriate place— 
 '''relevant confidentiality order' means a director's confidentiality order, individual member's confidentiality order, company members' confidentiality order or chargee's confidentiality order;'' 
(c) Subsection (6) is omitted. 
 (7) In section 723E(1) (offences), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723D, 723E, 723F or 723G''.'. 
New clause 26—Economic damage to companies— 
 '(1) A person (''person A'') commits an offence under this section if by acting in accordance with subsection (2) he causes financial damage to another person (''person B''), with the purpose of representing to person B, or persuading person B— 
(i) that he should not do something that he is legally entitled to do; or 
(ii) that he should do something that he is not under any legal obligation to do. 
 (2) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if those actions— 
(a) involve the harassment of or violence against person B or a connected person, or 
(b) involve damage to property of person B or a connected person. 
 (3) A connected person, for the purposes of subsection (2) above, means— 
(a) a customer of person B; 
(b) a shareholder of person B; 
(c) an employee of person B; 
(d) a director of person B; 
(e) where person B is a partnership, its partners; 
(f) a supplier of goods or services to person B; 
(g) a supplier of goods or services to persons within paragraph (f) above; 
(h) an individual normally residing with any individual falling within paragraphs (a) to (g) above. 
 (4) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone whom he reasonably suspects to be committing an offence within subsection (1) above. 
 (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'. 
New clause 32—Animal research: intention to cause economic loss— 
 '(1) A person commits an offence if, by acting in accordance with subsection (3) and with the necessary intent— 
(a) he induces one connected person— 
(i) to breach a contract between that connected person and another connected person, or
(ii) to terminate a contract between that connected person and another connected person (whether or not the termination constitutes a breach of the contract), or 
(b) he persuades one connected person— 
(i) not to enter into a contract with another connected person, or 
(ii) not to have commercial dealings (of whatever nature) with another connected person. 
 (2) No person shall be guilty of an offence under this section— 
(a) by virtue of his doing anything in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, 
(b) if he is exercising any power conferred on him by any enactment, 
(c) if he is acting for the purposes of making a protected disclosure falling within Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (protected disclosures). 
 (3) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if he carries out or threatens any unlawful activity against a connected person (whether or not that person is one of the connected persons mentioned in subsection (1)). 
 (4) In subsection (1), the necessary intent is the intent to— 
(a) prevent, stop or hinder an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator doing something which he is entitled to do, or 
(b) persuade an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator to do something which he is not under any obligation to do. 
 (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable— 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both, 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both. 
 (6) In this section— 
 ''animal research facility operator'' means a person under whose direction or control the following are carried out— 
(a) regulated procedures for the purposes of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (c. 14) (''the 1986 Act''), as described in section 2 of that Act, or 
(b) the breeding of protected animals under the authority of a certificate under section 7 of the 1986 Act; 
 ''connected persons'' are— 
(c) animal research facility operators, 
(d) holders of licences under section 4 or 5 of the 1986 Act (personal licences and project licences), persons specified under section 6(5) or 7(5) of the 1986 Act (scientific procedure establishments and breeding and supplying establishments), 
(e) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) or (f) to (k) of this subsection, 
(f) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraph (d) above, 
(g) customers of an animal research facility operator, 
(h) shareholders in an animal research facility operator (if the operator is a company), 
(i) subsidiaries of an animal research facility operator, 
(j) companies of which an animal research facility operator is a subsidiary, 
(k) trade organisations representing animal research facility operators, 
(l) trade unions whose members include employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above, 
(m) employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above, 
(n) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (i) above is a company, its directors, 
(o) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (f) above is a partnership firm its partners, and 
(p) individuals normally residing with any individual falling within paragraph (a) to (g) or (l) to (n) above;
 ''trade dispute'' has the same meaning as in Part IV of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, 
 (7) The Secretary of State may by order— 
(a) add a description of person to the list of connected persons in subsection (6), 
(b) remove a description of person from that list, 
(c) amend the list in some other way.'. 
Amendment No. 311, in title, line 10, after 'Scotland;', insert 
'to make provision in connection with economic damage to companies;'.

Evan Harris: This is the first time that I have spoken in this Committee. I came specifically to speak to some of the amendments and clauses in this group—we clearly have a large group of matters to discuss.
It might be convenient if I explain the order in which I will deal with the issues and the amendments tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). Amendments Nos. 341 and 342 deal with clause 116, and amendments Nos. 343 and 344 with clause 117. They are followed by new clause 32, which is important. I note that the Conservatives also have amendments in the group, to which we will respond when they have spoken to them. I know that my hon. Friend hopes to speak to amendment No. 101, which is tabled in his name. 
Clauses 116 to 118 relate to problems of animal rights extremism, although they do not specifically state that. Given that we have so much ground to cover, I do not think that this Committee is the place to make long speeches about the issue, but I would like to put on record a number of points about the problem that the clauses are intended to solve. 
Work using animals for medical research is necessary, valuable and carefully regulated. Often it is necessary because of Government requirements for toxicity testing; the onus is therefore on the Government and Parliament to ensure that individuals and firms can carry out in peace the testing required by Government, Parliament and statute, that they are not subject to unwarranted intimidation and that they are not victims of violent acts or harassment. Such work is valuable not only to identifying new treatments for human and animal disease, but to the livelihood of people working in the pharmaceutical and medical research industries and indirectly to the economic well-being of the country. That is why we have to ensure that the work can be carried out in this country free from harassment, the threat of violence and intimidation. It is important that Parliament and the Government ensure that the legislative framework provides for that as well as possible. 
Some people object to the use of animals in medical research, even when it is carefully regulated. They have the right to hold those views—many members of my party, and of all others, share them—and they should have the right to express them peacefully. However, I have not yet met a Member of the House of Commons who supports the activities covered by the clauses: harassment, intimidation, threats of violence and  violence. It is clearly possible without having recourse to harassment, intimidation, violence and threats of violence to have a debate, to have protests, to have strongly held views and to advance those views, to seek for them to be debated and for regulation to be reviewed and changed if necessary. 
Although I am usually sceptical about increases in the law surrounding personal freedom and the ability to protest, my party and I agree that the clauses, on balance, are a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem. We do not believe that they go so wide as to catch animal rights or any other protest activity that we do not want to catch. Nevertheless, we recognise that there is a debate to be had. We look forward to that debate and to hearing any concerns that may be expressed. We hope that the Government will be open to tabling amendments if not now, then later, if issues are raised by people who believe that the powers are too wide. Local businesses and constituents in my area and that of the hon. Member for Huntingdon, and probably in the constituencies of other hon. Members, have been put under huge pressure, which I shall discuss when I speak to new clause 32. 
Clause 116 is designed to extend the provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to make it absolutely clear in law that the Act can be used to protect the victims of harassment or alleged harassment when one or more persons are involved. That is set out in the explanatory notes. I understand that some court judgments have taken a literal view of the word ''another'' in the Act—there was a case in Hull, for example, in which a company could not be protected under the Act because of the rather narrow interpretation of the relevant section. I understand what clause 116 aims to do, and I support it. 
Amendment No. 341 is a probing amendment, designed to elicit from the Government an explanation of two points—three, when taken with amendment No. 342. First, is the term ''may be a victim'' too wide? Anyone ''may'' be a victim, particularly in the case of harassment that is intended to have victims but that we hope can be stopped at some point during the harassment. Amendment No. 341 probes whether the words ''reasonably considered to be'' a victim might therefore be appropriate. 
Similarly, one might argue that it would be unfortunate if intelligence showed clear evidence of a plan to harass and that there had already been harassment elsewhere, but one did not want anyone to become a victim of that harassment before having a form of legislative comeback. I do not know whether that would be appropriate, and I suggested the words ''or target'' to probe the Government's view of how predictive such a measure is deemed to be. I am concerned about legislating against intended crime rather than against crime itself, but I would be grateful if the Minister explained whether, if there is clear intelligence of a plan or conspiracy to harass and a pattern of behaviour has already been set in motion that suggests that there is about to be another victim who has not yet been harassed, that person will be  protected, particularly if the victims of the previous activity are unwilling or unable to give evidence in court, whereas a future victim or target may be able to. 
It is not clear to me why subsection (2)(a) is needed when subsection (2)(b) seems to cover the persons listed in proposed new subsection (1A)(c), which seems to cover most people. Will the Minister clarify? Proposed new section 3A(2)(a) seems to suggest that the person need not even fall within proposed new subsection (1A)(c), so I question what sort of people are included in proposed new section 3A(2) who are not already included in subsection (2)(b). 
Clause 117, as the Minister will no doubt explain, deals with home visits, which is a prevalent tactic among animal rights extremists. It is a great problem for medical researchers and for the companies associated with them. As I understand it, the measure is designed to ensure that people can be caught on one occasion in order to prevent a flitting campaign, going from house to house and home to home. 
Amendment No. 343 simply probes the Government to see whether an individual's presence is required for the provisions on harassment to apply, or whether conduct using remote means—electronic communications and then an amplifier, for example—that causes alarm and distress but does not require the actual presence of the perpetrator is covered. 
Amendment No. 344 probes the Government about why new subsection 42A(3) is required. It states that 
 ''The references in subsection (1)(c) and (d) to a person's presence are references to his presence either alone or together with that of any other persons who are also present.'' 
I am sure that there is a good reason, but the explanatory notes merely restate that wording, so I should be grateful if the Minister explained why that is a requirement. What does it seek to capture that is not already captured? 
Clause 118 deals with the police direction to somebody to stay away from a person's home issued in advance of its having been found that he has been there. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome has a view in relation to amendment No. 101 about the rights of people who face a police direction of that kind. 
New clause 32 deals with the separate question of economic damage. Members of the Committee will have received the briefing that I have had from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry demonstrating how great a problem that is. It is a problem for the individuals concerned and their families—sometimes including families far removed from the economic purpose of the company and, indeed, companies several times removed from the work involving animals. It is also a problem for economic reasons. There are concerns that research and development investment will decline because this country is no longer a civilised place in which to undertake such business, even though it is valuable, necessary and carefully regulated. There is evidence that such investment decreased last year for the first time in a long time. That is worrying on economic grounds as well as on the human grounds that I have set out. 
New clause 32 would create a new offence in relation to animal research and the specific intention to cause economic loss. It is not the sort of measure that should be taken lightly, and that is why I was keen to ensure that we could debate the matter. The hon. Member for Huntingdon has tabled an analogous new clause, the terms of which I believe—I should not interpret it for him—go a little wider than those of mine. We both wanted a debate in Committee so that, if the Government were minded to do something of the kind, they could be informed of the views of members of the Committee before tabling an amendment on Report. It is of course regrettable that there is not already something showing the Government's intention for us to see now, but the debate presents us with an opportunity. Perhaps the Government are thinking of something with similar architecture, and we can thus carry out at least partial scrutiny of their proposals. 
I shall not go through the new clause in detail because of the time constraints, but I hope that the Government will comment on it in reasonable detail. It is intended to create a new offence in the context of an unlawful activity that is already taking place. I draw the Committee's attention to subsection (3), which would require a person to have carried out or threatened 
''any unlawful activity against a connected person'' 
to fall within the ambit of the new clause. It could be argued that a new offence is not necessary if unlawful activity has already taken place that could be prosecuted or lead to proceedings, but I do not agree. Extra sentencing provisions may be available where an offence is part of a pattern of activity, but there will be occasions when victims of harassment and intimidation are not willing to seek a prosecution and find it onerous to be forced to give evidence in public, particularly if the root problem is their being exposed, accused or intimidated. 
The new clause provides that if there is a contract between connected persons as defined in subsection (6), a person can commit an offence if, by acting in accordance with subsection (3)—that is, committing a separate offence—he attempts to induce a connected  person to breach a contract, as set out in subsection (1). The wording used is not dissimilar from that in clause 116 and in other legislation. 
I believe that the new clause is a proportionate response and is sufficiently narrow not to cause excessive concern to people who, like me, take a civil libertarian view of protest. First, the measure is restricted to the context of animal research. I know that there is debate and argument—we may touch on that in connection with new clause 26—about whether other spheres of activity might in the future be subject to the same sort of harassment and intimidation. I accept that internet methods could be used in other contexts about which strong views are held, including areas of science and technology such as mobile phone masts or genetically modified crops. Nevertheless, because the intention to cause economic loss is potentially a relatively wide offence, without—except in relation to the existing unlawful act—specific individual victims, a high threshold should be set, including an existing problem, a pattern of behaviour, and a network of people who have not been tackled by existing legislation, before a law of this kind should be made. 
Animal research protests meet the criteria that we want to meet. There is an established problem, which has existed for several years and is getting worse. Existing legislation has been tried but has not worked, and the activity that is being affected is carefully regulated and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament has made it clear that the activity is an economic, scientific, academic and research activity that it supports, within clear regulation, which is subject to review and can be amended. That, by definition, narrows the proposed provision, because one would not expect the same problem to arise in less well regulated areas of activity. 
If problems arise in another sphere, the Government might come forward with a package to regulate it, so that the public can see that Parliament is willing to regulate it. Alongside that legislation, the Government might also introduce something similar to my new clause. However, many people would have problems with a wider provision, which is why I am concerned about the new clause that the hon. Member for Huntingdon tabled and why I thought to table a narrower one. 
I understand that some people feel that the new clause is too wide and might prevent legitimate protest. I do not believe that, because subsection (2) details exemptions relating to industrial relations disputes and, for example, the work of inspectors of animal research establishments, who may well by their findings have an economic effect—rightly so, if they find breaches of the regulation. Subsection (2) also protects disclosure under the so-called whistleblower's Act. I do not believe that those provisions would catch journalists doing their job or consumer boycotts, because they require that someone is carrying out or threatening unlawful activity, which is nothing like  journalistic campaigns, lobbying or calling for consumer boycotts. Marches and protests that are within the existing law and that do not harass also fall outside the provisions, which would apply only to those who are threatening unlawful activity. 
I shall draw my remarks to a close, because other hon. Members want to speak and we have a strict timetable. I recognise the Government's support for the industry and the people in my constituency who work in animal research. There are questions to be asked about how quickly the Government have responded to the issues, but there is no doubt that Ministers in the Home Office and the Department of Trade and Industry are now actively engaged with the problem. The measures in the clause—and those in new clause 32, if the Government accept it or introduce something similar, albeit not significantly wider I hope—will show that the Government are committed to legislating to protect the livelihoods and interests of those conducting such important work. 
I hope that the Government will bear in mind that although there might be considerable support in the House for such measures, we must have regard for the civil liberties issues. The fact that there is a problem and a desire to solve it—I believe that Opposition parties will support most of the Government's measures—makes it incumbent on us to ensure that the measures are not drawn too widely, because they will not be subject to the degree of scrutiny to which contentious measures are usually subject. In saying so, however, I welcome the proposals and commend new clause 32 in particular.

Jonathan Djanogly: We are having a general debate on animal rights issues. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon gave a good justification of the need for animal testing, and I will not take up more of the Committee's time in adding to what he said. However, although direct action and terrorist activity is emanating from animal rights activities today, the same methods could be used tomorrow by other groups. If drugs manufacturers and animal testing companies are affected now, meat importers, road builders, handbag manufacturers, furniture makers or mining companies could be affected next week. The provisions are general and reflect that.
For too long, the Government and the City have allowed pharmaceutical companies to be attacked, while hoping that the issue would just fade away. It will not just go away; unless we counter it head-on, it will fester, grow and become much more of a problem, across a much bigger board. We must act, and we must act now. 
I heard the Liberals' approach to the clauses. The official Opposition will support the clauses, although they are too little, too late. The Government have been made fully aware of the problem, but have failed to act to the extent necessary to deal with it. 
So, what is the problem that faces us now? There are animal rights extremists, who can, and should, be classified as terrorists. Of course, the vast majority of animal rights activists are not terrorists, but within their ranks are activists who are prepared to use the worst varieties of extreme violence and intimidation to  get their way. Those people organise themselves in cells, operate internationally and fund themselves internationally, which, to me, indicates a terrorist organisation. I would be interested to hear whether the Government have considered proscribing organisations such as the Animal Liberation Front or Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty under the terrorism laws. 
No one has yet given me an accurate assessment of the number of extreme protesters, although the number of incidents involved makes it likely that there are at least a few hundred people who are prepared to use severe violence, at least against property. Here is a taste of some sections from a leaflet that was openly handed out at one of their meetings. These meetings, by the way, are attended by members of the public, as well as the hard core. The leaflet says: 
 ''This edition . . . is dedicated to the hands on animal abusing scum who kill animals everyday at HLS, get paid for it and then go home eat their dinner and put their feet up and relax by watching some mindless television. They are smug in the knowledge that they are safe and hassle free at the moment. Well, enough is enough. These monsters do not have the right to a happy life. How dare they do what they do behind closed doors. They are all cowards, bullies and perverts. What we want to do is show you how to move things along a little faster . . . Direct action works. It's as simple as that. Think what you wouldn't want done to you and do it to them. Think what would cause you stress and worry, what would keep you up at night, what would give you a headache or cause you embarrassment.'' 
It then gives a list of things to do. Let me mention just one: 
 ''A simple tactic has been adopted recently. Simply pick you target and throw a couple of rape alarms in their roof guttering or thick hedgerow and leg it (in the middle of the night obviously). Being kept awake at night hardly puts you in a good mood at work or with your family.'' 
The list goes on an on, but I do not think that hon. Members will appreciate it being put on the public record for people to read. At the end, however, are the names of 35 directors, employees and scientists at drug-testing companies. It says which of them have children; it names their partners; and it gives their addresses and telephone numbers. The fact that half of those people live in my constituency is, of course, of particular concern to me, but, as hon. Members can imagine, this sort of stuff is of extreme concern to any normal thinking person. 
Over recent years, a frenzy of hate and violence has been directed at scientists and research workers. All pharma and biotech companies that want to market new drugs will have to test them on animals at some point, and many such companies have testing facilities. The unique point about places such as Huntingdon Life Sciences and the Newchurch guinea pig farm, however, is that they are exclusively animal testing-related, so they tend to act as a weather vane for the wider industry. 
HLS has approximately 1,000 employees in my constituency, so, unfortunately, I have significant knowledge of this issue. Every week, I receive notice from constituents who live in constant fear of violence. I have heard of things being put through letterboxes, hooded thugs scaring kids at home, cars vandalised, homes daubed with paint, neighbours told that the victim is a paedophile, people's cars being filmed as  they leave home or work, people being followed home from work, messages left on phones, and sleep deprivation. Let me give a typical example from the website of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty about a raid—such raids occur daily, sometimes more frequently. 
 ''The Animal Liberation Front is claiming responsibility for the two recent actions taken against Huntingdon Life Sciences. In the early hours of 10th of September, a newly formed cell of volunteers visited the homes of two . . . directors . . . in Surrey and Sussex, and planted crude white-spirit devices under their cars. As a result of this action, we have learned that 
the company 
''have terminated their contract with HLS. We did not want to take this action, as we are not violent individuals, but ordinary people, caught up within a system of institutionalised violence that is perpetuated against all life on this planet.'' 
That is the way in which those people think. It is what is happening in this country daily in areas that have testing units and pharmaceutical units. However, the situation has been changing. The trigger came when HLS managed to secure an injunction under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which was originally intended to stop stalking. 
Without my going into all the details, the court found that the injunction could cover all the employees, and at multiple locations, including employees' homes. Injunctions have subsequently been sought by various companies, and gradually the courts have extended the remit of the injunctions so that the one granted recently in respect of Oxford university also covers unnamed third-party suppliers to the proposed research premises. As the scope of such injunctions has been extended by the courts beyond what was, perhaps, the original intention of the Act, so the risk of their being overturned at a full hearing has grown. 
Clause 116 aims to redress the balance, in that for a harassment conviction to be secured, it needs to be proven that there has been a course of conduct in which a person harassed another. The strict interpretation of that by the courts will now be widened, as the clause extends the Act to cover harassment of two or more people who are connected, even if each individual is harassed on only one occasion. New section 3A will also allow for a wider group of individuals to be clearly covered by the order. Can the Minister confirm that the word ''person'' in section 3A(2) will include companies? I think that that is the case. The Liberal Democrats' amendments Nos. 341 and 342 would have the effect of slightly broadening the application of the clause and would make it more bullet proof by inserting the reasonableness qualification. I have no objection to either of them. 
Clause 117 creates the new offence of harassment of a person in his home, as an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. Under section 42 of that Act, the police are able to direct protesters to move away from premises. The new provision is intended to catch broadly similar behaviour with four ingredients needing to be proved. I shall not read them out; they are in the Bill. 
Amendment No. 343 extending presence to conduct is sensible. My hon. Friends and I have proposed two changes to the clause. First, we fail to see why the arresting constable needs to be in uniform. A constable, as we have discussed in previous debates, has the powers of a constable whatever he is wearing. Amendments Nos. 224 and 223 provide for the possibility of the offence being heard in a Crown court as well as in a magistrates court with the longer possible sentence of three years. 
Such offences can be so serious and damaging to families and children living at home that a maximum of 51 weeks seems inappropriate in the possible circumstances. We support clause 118, which allows the police to make a direction to a person to leave the vicinity of a home and specifies that they cannot return to the vicinity for a set period of up to three months. Should they return within that period, they will be committing an offence. However, as with the previous clause, we would like the possibility of an indictment with up to three years in prison. That is the reason for amendment No. 225. 
I note that the Liberals have suggested that the Law Society amendment No. 101 should be included, allowing for an appeal against the making of the direction to the magistrates court. Although we understand the need for a balance and the right of an individual to seek redress from a constable's decision, we feel that that right must only kick in after a reasonable period to ensure that our courts are not clogged up with minor appeals. Our compromise is for a right of appeal to exist if the constable's direction lasts for more than 10 days, as proposed in amendment No. 254. 
That is where the Government have reached when it comes to dealing with the problem. Unfortunately, the scenario has now changed. It would seem as though the Government either have not realised that or, more likely, are not willing to realise that. Therefore, let me explain why my hon. Friends and I are now proposing new clauses 18 to 23 and new clause 26. 
The injunctions have been working fairly well. About a dozen companies—perhaps more—have obtained them and their impact has been to stop business premises and employees' homes being invaded or targeted openly. However, that has meant that the extremists' campaign has become wider and  often more underground. Yesterday, the ABPI released some interesting figures, which were alluded to in part by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon. They showed that the number of home visits to directors was down to 90 in 2004 compared with 113 in the previous year. For employees, the number went down from 146 to 89. However, anonymous activities have increased, with abusive calls rising from 38 in 2003 to 108 in 2004, and 177 instances of criminal damage compared with 146 the previous year and only 60 the year before. Most of those are conducted in the middle of the night. 
Furthermore, as the pharma and research companies were the first to take out injunctions, the extremists have now started to look for easier targets. Therefore we have seen a rise in the number of secondary and tertiary target companies. In 2002, 113 companies were targeted. In 2003, 203 were targeted and last year 313 were targeted, with 29 of those reporting more than 10 criminal incidents against them. The extremists' basic idea is that the target company is bullied until it signs a declaration that it will not trade with the initial target. In the last quarter of 2004, 42 companies were bullied into so-called capitulations: 37 per cent. of the years' total capitulations. 
Typically, the target company will be sent a letter saying that it must sign a document promising not to trade with Huntingdon Life Sciences, for example, and that if it does not sign, it will be put on the SHAC website. That is often threat enough to get a capitulation. For the brave traders who refuse to be intimidated, being placed on the SHAC website means that their company is game for visits from the thugs. That is when it starts to get nasty. Normally things start with protesters invading the premises. More than a dozen small businesses in my constituency have called me, sometimes weeping on the phone because of the torment that they have been put through by those thugs. 
If the police get seriously involved, which happens occasionally, the cost can be dramatic. For instance, The Times reported on 18 January that the police have spent £2.5 million protecting the Staffordshire guinea pig farm. 
For most companies, however, full-time police protection is not an option; they only course is an injunction. A typical example is the small biotech company that wrote to me recently. It wrote: 
 ''To date, we have had three actual visits from SHAC activists . . . and various threatening letters mailed to our offices, as well as leaflets distributed outside our buildings and in neighbouring gardens. On the first visit . . . four protesters were inadvertently given access to our reception building by a member of staff. They were very disruptive, distributed leaflets and used megaphones outside our site. On the second visit . . . nine protesters appeared to force entry into the reception building, which was captured on CCTV. Then they made their way into four offices while causing complete havoc in reception. They were threatening and abusive, distributed leaflets in all offices and intimidated staff. This was a very well planned visit, with maximum disruption and a timely exit before the police arrived. On the third visit . . . four protesters demonstrated at our entrance with megaphones and very large banners. As our offices are amongst domestic dwellings, this caused great anxiety to many of our neighbours. Our main site is just opposite a housing development for elderly people. In addition, our . . . site is near a park, playgroup and primary school. The leader of the protesters . . . was videoing all the car registration numbers in our car park. She also tried to video through the office windows and as you can imagine this again caused anxiety to our members of staff. This was particularly disturbing for one female member of staff, who used to work at HLS and has been assaulted by SHAC protesters prior to working for us; she was very frightened and intimidated by the threats. They also tried to disrupt our AGM . . . by using megaphones air horns and displaying banners. The Police were on site to control threatening behaviour however we also hired security guards to protect the investors and employees on site . . . In light of these visits, we have had to upgrade our security system to protect our staff.'' 
The costs are broken down in the letter, but they are confidential, and I do not want to read them to the Committee, but take my word for it—they are very significant. The costs include those of obtaining an injunction, of installing security gates and CCTV systems, of having dedicated phone and fax numbers and e-mail addresses, of security guards and, of course, the huge cost of the lost man hours. The letter then states: 
 ''As you can see, this is not an insubstantial amount of money that was not included in our projected annual expenditure . . . Personally, I am baffled by the fact that the Government appears to be focusing on the war against terrorism abroad yet is paying scant attention to the terrorism that exists in the UK.'' 
That small biotech company really needs that money to be invested in its products, but it is having to spend it on security and buying injunctions. 
That company was slightly larger, and the problems are suffered mainly by the small, local family companies that supply pharmaceutical companies or research companies—for instance, with laundry services, taxis and cleaning services. Those companies cannot afford injunctions, which can cost anything from £30,000 to £300,000. 
More to the point, thousands of companies are saying, ''Why should we have to spend our money on injunctions when it should be for the state to defend us against terrorist activities?'' That is the fundamental issue that the Government are failing to address in the Bill. For instance, the injunction will normally include a clause allowing for a certain level of non-violent protest at set times and in set places outside the place of business. One company suggested to me that the Government could set out a more predetermined set of activities and of behaviour as a benchmark for regulating unlawful protest behaviour—for instance, a code similar to the picketing code could save hours of time and expense for the police, courts and British business in negotiating areas of protest, but the manner of protest and the number of permitted protesters, although ensuring legitimate protest, could continue. By the way, it is not only companies that the protesters attack. In the past six months, they have brutally threatened to disrupt two schools in Cambridgeshire that had invited HLS to their jobs fairs. That is how low those people will go. 
HLS shows how exposed British companies can be to concerted terrorist attack. We must learn lessons from it. Companies that have capitulated to the terrorist demands not to trade with HLS include Barclays, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, HSBC, Phillips and Drew, WestLB Penmure,  and Royal Bank of Scotland. HLS must now keep its current account at the Bank of England. All its market-makers and brokers refuse to deal with it; it cannot get insurance, other than from the DTI; and it has even had problems retaining its auditors. 
The utterly weak, unco-ordinated and short-termist view of the City towards defending its client's interests is the subject for another day's debate, although I note that the NAPF is now saying that it is waiting for a lead from the Government on what to do, and the Minister may wish to comment on that. 
We need, however, to be mindful of the impact on HLS. Unable to survive registered in this country—not least because of the hate mail and death threats being sent to its shareholders—it repatriated itself and is now thriving on the US stock exchange. It has re-registered in Maryland, where only holders of 5 per cent. or more of the company's shares have to be disclosed, and then only to other shareholders. I note that Montpelier in Oxford resisted the terrorists when it was building the university premises but stopped work when its shareholders started being threatened and attacked. 
And so it goes on. The extremists claimed yet another victory in December, after BOC severed its ties with HLS. Brian Cass, the managing director of HLS, said: 
 ''The stark reality is that companies like BOC are not guaranteed the security of their employees.'' 
Interestingly, BOC had got an injunction, and it was working. However, SHAC simply changed its tactics and began targeting Marks and Spencer, one of BOC's biggest clients. Therefore, leaving companies to fend for themselves through injunctions is simply not an adequate solution. 
If we do not get on top of this issue, we shall see lots more HLSs—lots more companies repatriating to the United States. We shall also see a flood of investment out of the United Kingdom. GlaxoSmithKline spends more than £1 billion a year in Britain, but its head, and the head of AstraZeneca, have apparently warned the Prime Minister that they will not spend another pound on new facilities unless action is take to stop the violence. The Government have placed R and D at the centre of their drive for a knowledge-based economy. Pharmas contribute £6.7 billion a year to Britain's GDP and £12 billion in exports. They employ 80,000 people directly and 250,000 indirectly. We are the world's largest pharma exporter; it is one of the few areas in which we really are world-beaters. All of that is at risk because of a few hundred—perhaps fewer—animal rights protesters. As the Government have included nothing in the Bill to address those concerns, however, we have tabled a package of new clauses and amendments that go some way towards doing so. 
I turn first to new clause 22. Some time ago, the Government provided for directors' confidentiality orders, which enabled directors under threat to have a service address, rather than their home address, used on the public register. That was a good move, which we supported; the only problem is that the previously filed home addresses are not removed from the public register at the same time, which rather ruins the effect.  The new clause therefore says that when a confidentiality order is put in place, all references to the director's previous addresses should be removed from the public register at the same time. 
I mention new clause 22 first because the same concept of confidentiality should be extended to the register of members of companies and the register of mortgagees of companies, both of which are currently open to public view under normal circumstances. The application of the provisions would be triggered using the same rationale as currently exists for directors; the justification for the order does not take us into new territory. 
New Clause 18 provides for an individual company member to apply to have his or her name and address made private. New clause 19 provides for a company to apply to have its entire register of members made private. If companies are not to move abroad or to cease doing business with companies such as HLS, it is vital that we can defend their members' personal details. Of course, one could say that people should use nominee services, but no company in this country is prepared to act as a nominee for HLS. Having companies act as their own nominees is not practical, nor is it acceptable to many shareholders and companies. We could go down the route taken in America—in Maryland, to which HLS has repatriated—of making registers of members secret. However, that would be to go too far. Our amendment provides a fair and workable halfway house. 
New clause 20 aims to secure privacy for funders. Of course, there is no reason why a bank's details need to be made public in respect of a normal loan. However, a bank will usually wish to secure the mortgage or charge, and the security interest does need to be placed on the public register. Our proposal would mean that the bank's security would still be registered, so warning people of the loan's existence, but the bank's name and address would be made private. New clause 21 extends the impact of confidentiality orders to associated companies, and new clause 23 covers various bits of tidying up relating to confidentiality orders. 
That brings me to my final point, and to new clause 26. It seems that in this country to destroy a company through violence and intimidation is not a criminal offence. I suggest—and I see that the Liberal Democrats are doing so in new clause 32—that that needs to change. I would be the first to agree that we need to debate the scope of this type of provision—to avoid restricting legitimate trade disputes and whistleblowers, for instance. However, if we can protect individuals, I cannot believe that we cannot also find an appropriate balance for companies. 
New clause 26 aims to prevent companies from being forced to act, or not act, in a certain way in circumstances in which there is harassment, violence or damage to property. In other words, it stays well clear of anything to do with peaceful protest. New clause 32, put forward by the hon. Member for  Oxford, West and Abingdon, the ABPI option, does roughly the same thing, but it ties down the application just to animal research facility operators. I shall be interested to hear the Minister's views. I have already given my reasons for believing that research companies are just the tip of the iceberg. The protection that is offered should be available more widely, not least because making law for just one sector seems to be unusual and might produce policy difficulties. I am open-minded on the issue; if the Government bring forward a suitable proposal, we will consider it. 
Let me end with a warning. Any legislation that we agree on here will mean nothing unless the fight against extremists is properly led and funded by Government. Such support has been lacking to date. I hope that the Bill represents a change in the Government's attitude to one of the most pressing problems facing British business and affecting the personal security of individuals.

David Heath: We have had an interesting debate, led by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon and the hon. Member for Huntingdon, both of whom have direct constituency interests in the matter. That is crucial, as it informs their comments. My hon. Friend is concerned not only with the university but with companies that operate in association with it, and the hon. Gentleman with Huntingdon Life Sciences, which has been targeted for a long time.
It is important that we stress that we understand the views of those who oppose animal experimentation, and who argue strongly that it should be further regulated, or even that it should cease altogether. We should also recognise that we have an extremely well regulated system in this country. That was not always the case. My hon. Friend and I are probably the only members of the Committee who held licences for vivisection during our earlier lives. It was not because we wanted them; I certainly did not, and neither, I assume, did my hon. Friend. I was very uncomfortable to have one, but it was a requirement of matriculation in my university course. As an undergraduate, when I took my physiology degree in the early 1970s, I had a licence for procedures on live animals. It was entirely unnecessary for the degree course I was taking, and I was not undertaking any research. Frankly, it is far better that licences are not handed out in such a cavalier fashion nowadays, and that animals are spared as a result. Times have changed. 
The right of people to protest is something we should uphold and be clear about. However, their rights do not extend to intimidation, harassment, violence, death threats, or actions that could cause death or serious injury. Those are uncivilised and inappropriate acts, outside the norms of a civilised society. 
I am pleased that the Government have brought forward their proposals. We are concerned that they are not sufficiently comprehensive to meet the demand, and I will be interested to see what the Minister has to say. I want to raise three points, beginning with an issue raised by the hon. Member for  Huntingdon. Does the word ''person'' in the context of these clauses include a body corporate? I assume that it does, but it is important that we understand that. If so, I have an ancillary question: does a university have the legal personality of a body corporate? I am not clear about that. I hope that someone is, because universities are important to this debate. 
Secondly, will the new provisions deal with the protection of communities as well as individuals? I say that not because I do not understand that communities are made up of individuals, but simply because, as the Minister knows, there have been cases where whole communities have been harassed in a way that is abhorrent and deplorable. The harassment may not be directly linked to any particular individuals, but may be conducted simply on the grounds that everyone somehow shares a corporate responsibility for something that is going on within that community. I do not entirely understand why police forces in the areas concerned are not able at the moment to take more effective action. I am sorry if that sounds like a criticism, but there are many provisions under the Public Order Act 1986, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the Criminal Justice & Police Act 2001 where I would have expected rather more robust action to have been taken on the basis of the activities currently taking place. I share the view of the hon. Member for Huntingdon that we can do what we like in legislation, but until policed effectively that legislation will not have the proper effect. Is it the Minister's view that intelligence or enforcement might fall within the responsibilities of the Serious Organised Crime Agency? The borderline of that agency's responsibilities is unclear, as is whether organised harassment is something with which it might properly be concerned, as in many cases it is a national or international conspiracy. 
My third point, which amplifies the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon made in respect of new clause 32, is that it is surely right that special circumstances apply to companies or universities that are licensed under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. That is the crux of the matter. There is a clearly defined group of companies and individuals who are vulnerable to such intimidation. 
I entirely understand the Conservatives' point about the capacity for such harassment to be extended into other areas. However, I am equally conscious of the need to strike a balance, because there can be perfectly legitimate protest against the activities of companies, whether as part of a trade union dispute or because people simply do not think that those activities are ethical. 
I remember a time, again in the early 1970s, when Barclays bank was heavily investing in the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Barclays branch in Oxford had to change its blotting paper every day because every day, curiously, it was defaced with the words ''Barclays are a piggy bank''. As soon as the blotting paper was removed, a new piece was similarly defaced. Some might say that that was potentially causing economic damage to Barclays. 
Finally, clause 118 deals with ''police direction to stay away from a person's home''. I wonder whether the Minister considered a similar direction to stay away from a person's place of work or whether she believes that to be covered elsewhere. Very often harassment takes place not at a person's home but at the university department or other place of work where they are engaged in a lawful activity, so I wonder why that is not covered specifically. 
Before I resume my seat I must briefly mention amendment No. 101, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend and concerns the order-making power that clause 118 gives to the police. I understand the need for that power, but a degree of judicial oversight is important when dealing with the power, given under proposed new section 42(4)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, of a police constable to impose a direction 
''to leave that vicinity and not to return to it within such period as the constable may specify, not being longer than 3 months''. 
That is a fairly hefty direction from the police and it would not be unreasonable for it to be open to challenge within the legal system—for confirmation by a magistrate. The hon. Member for Huntingdon said that he thought that was fine, but that it ought to be necessary to wait for 10 days. That is a slightly novel view. Given the severity of the potential order-making power, the matter ought to return a magistrates court. That could be done in two ways. The first way would be by appeal, although I accept that that might, for example, cause appeals to magistrates courts, which I would not want to encourage. Alternatively, an order could be of a minimum duration in the first instance, after which the constable would be required to go to a magistrates court for confirmation of the order over a longer period. That would have the added advantage that the person on whom the order was served would have no doubts about its scope and what was intended. 
Also, there is no capacity in clause 118 as drafted for an officer to serve a written order. The possibility for confusion and argument when returning to court for a breach of an order is quite patent. It is therefore good practice that the terms of an order be confirmed, despite the fact that it might, dare I say it, increase the bureaucracy of the procedure, in order to make it court-proof later.

Caroline Flint: This is an important debate. I very much welcome the fact that the hon. Members for Oxford, West and Abingdon and for Huntingdon are serving on the Committee, because the targets of the attacks about which we have heard today are in their constituencies. Having said that, I am a little concerned by the tone that the hon. Member for Huntingdon has taken today, which does not help the debate or help us all to acknowledge how serious this  issue is or what progress has been made in other areas in the past year or so, particularly with regard to police response, which was mentioned in particular.
One of the difficulties that we face is that on the one hand we have 43 police forces working with communities, which is very positive, but on the other we have animal rights extremists who, by their very nature, can target an individual at a company in the north-west that supplies Huntingdon and be down in the south-west the next day targeting other companies there. We have had the problem of ensuring that we link those incidents, partly because some of the supply companies involved are not aware of the possible threat to them, probably because the parent company may not want to alarm them unduly. To deal with that, we have taken action in several different ways on several different fronts. First, we have established the national extremism tactical co-ordinating unit, whose role is to ensure better policing and joined-up thinking and to take forensic evidence from one part of the country to see if it matches forensics from another part of the country. Because of that activity, which is ongoing, there has been a huge increase in the number of arrests and convictions of the relatively small number of people involved in these offences. We must continue to do better, but that is a practical measure. 
The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome makes the very valid point that police forces already have several different pieces of legislation that they can enforce in several different sets of circumstances. One of the things that we have been trying to ensure while developing this legislation is that we do not lose sight of what powers the police can already, and importantly need to, use. Police forces up and down the country need to be aware of the nature of the people with whom we are dealing as well as the nature of their offences, which are very serious and are not simply one-offs. 
We should also acknowledge that the UK probably has the toughest regulation in the world on experimentation and research involving animals. That is important to remember. That is not to say that alternatives to the use of animals cannot be developed in the future, which we support. It should be acknowledged that there have been developments in the past 50 years in several different areas, which we welcome, and we set up the national centre for the 3Rs to support that activity. The reality, however, is that animals are still needed in several different areas. Polls of the British public have shown that although people have genuine concerns about the use of animals, they understand why there are no alternatives when the matter is explained to them, and the majority are in favour of the use of animals for research. It is also important to acknowledge the several organisations and groups concerned about animal welfare and the use of animals for testing and research that have nothing to do with the activities that we are discussing today. 
Clause 116 also amends the civil remedy in section 3 of the 1997 Act to clarify that a company can apply to the High Court or county court for an injunction to protect persons associated with a company from harassment. In answer to the question raised by a couple of hon. Members about injunctions, people who will be covered by proposed new section 3A(2)(a) are not necessarily the people whose behaviour the protest is intended to change. Such a person might be a relative of a director, for example, and not directly involved in the activities in question. 
Proposed new section 3A(2)(b) would enable companies to apply for injunctions as well. In addition, the main company—Huntingdon Life Sciences, for example—could obtain an injunction to protect smaller companies, such as supply companies. That would enable Huntingdon Life Sciences to protect its laundry company, for instance.

David Heath: Would there be a requirement on the principal company to list the supplier companies by name in an application for an injunction, or could the application cover any company in a contractual relationship with it, so that it would not need to return to court every time that a new supplier was taken on?

Caroline Flint: I shall check the detail on that point and notify the hon. Gentleman, if that is all right.
A person, in relation to an injunction, includes a body corporate, but it is individuals rather than companies who are the victims of harassment. My understanding is that the term ''person'' would included university institutions as well. I think that that is how the matter stands, but I shall check. 
We are trying to bear down on aspects of the matter where there are gaps and problems. One of the difficulties in dealing with animal rights extremists is that they are very canny in identifying loopholes and gaps in the system. The clause is important, but it is also important that it should anticipate future similar activity by other groups. That is why the provisions are  not confined to dealing with those involved in animal rights extremism. 
Without the changes, it would remain uncertain whether companies could apply for injunctive relief under the 1997 Act. It would also be more difficult for the police and prosecutors to charge and prosecute those who harassed employees of different companies, as they would have to show that an extremist pursued a course of conduct that amounted to harassment of the same individual on at least two occasions. The provisions will help the police. 
Amendment No. 341 does not add anything to the drafting. The term ''may be'' is no wider than the term ''may be reasonably considered to be''. A person who may be a victim of harassment will clearly already be someone who is reasonably considered to be a victim of harassment. One of the issues is recognition of the wide group of victims that we are considering. A niece  of the Hall family of Darley Oaks was harassed while working in a pub. I understand that every window of the pub was smashed and she had to leave her job. 
There have been instances of harassment of social organisations to which people working for animal research companies, either directly or in supply, belong. The chairman of the local golf club or other association, or a charity that someone is involved with, has been seen as a potential pressure point on the individual who provides supplies for or is directly involved in the research. I understand people's sensitivities about civil liberties and about how wide the provision is going, but it is a matter of the context. 
It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.